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INTRODUCTION
The last quarter of the twentieth century may well go down in history as the spawning ground for new waves of technological change. Information and communications technologies (ICTs) were the first of these. With the advent of the semi-conductor, waves of technological change transformed traditional telecommunications processes, led to the creation of knowledge-based products in a wide variety of different industries and launched a new era in information processing. The internet opened still newer vistas in the generation, storage and exchange of knowledge.
Information and communication technologies have generated many benefits, but their distribution around the globe has not been even. Alongside the literature on the ICT revolution, there thus came its sequel, that of the digital divide. In the search for a manageable solution, infrastructure was identified as the prime factor in a pattern of international exclusion that had begun to emerge. Hidden from view was the knowledge dimension and the way in which scarce knowledge resources affect the use and diffusion of new technologies. Also largely absent were systemic considerations which might have brought earlier into focus, the associated problems of content, cost and ancillary manufacturing and service activities; all of which are yet to be resolved.
Despite their generic and transformatory nature, ICTs, in many respects, were a transitional technology and thus only a foretaste of what may be in store. They emerged within the paradigm of earlier mechanically based industrial revolutions and only now are beginning to incorporate the nano-level technologies and products that are central to new wave technologies.
Their introduction has been incremental thus opening opportunities for those developing countries with financial, organizational and knowledge resources to begin a process of catching up.
In the second wave of technological change, that growing out of biotechnology and its application to pharmaceuticals and agriculture, the knowledge dimension, now focused on a strong science base and intensive patenting activity, is unavoidably evident. The belief that development pathways of the past will be those trodden in the future must thus be tempered by this new reality. In a knowledge-based economy, the locus of knowledge creation and the forms through which knowledge is appropriated will increasingly shape opportunities for learning, for innovation and thus for growth and development.
8
A third wave of technological change, involving nano-materials and hydrogen as an energy source, will soon be upon us. Just how soon is a matter of conjecture since the extensive systems embeddedness of these new wave technologies, in social, economic and technological terms, have until recently, slowed their application, particularly in the transport sector. But that is changing rapidly and it is in this context that the role of the South as a 'technology user' is becoming increasingly problematic. Looking back to the impact of ICTs and Biotechnology, it raises the specter of a cumulative and path dependent growth in inequalities between North and South in the future.
The objective of the present paper is to explore this larger issue in relation to the development of one particular technology, the proton exchange membrane (PEM) fuel cell and its diffusion within the automotive industry and to assess its potential consequences for countries in the South. Fuel cells, which can convert hydrogen directly into electricity without combustion or moving parts, will, as one author put it, bring "energy conversion out of the "age of fire" into the "age of electrochemistry" (Williams: 1994,22) .
Section one of the paper sets out a framework for the analysis of the technological change process in new wave technologies. Section two applies it to explore the development of the internal combustion engine (ICE) and the subsequent evolution of automobile technology based on this motive force. Section 3 analyzes the emergence and development of PEM fuel cells and identifies those factors most likely to affect the speed of their commercial establishment in the automobile sector. The concluding section will sum up these findings and provide an overall assessment of how far we have come towards the establishment of a hydrogen fuel cell vehicle as the dominant design of the future. It will then broadly sketch out some of the consequences that this may have for developing countries drawing upon the experience of the past several decades marked by the rapid diffusion of new wave technologies and the widening of technological and knowledge divides.
UNDERSTANDING NEW WAVE TECHNOLOGIES
Models of broad-based technological change frequently referred to in the literature as technological revolutions (Utterback: 1994; Freeman & Perez: 1988; Perez: 2002) , traditionally distinguish three phases in the emergence and development of a technology. The first is the period in which the new technology emerges, product innovation is intense and product variety widens. This is followed by a transitional phase during which competition in the marketplace or performance standards set by law lead to the establishment of a dominant product design (Utterback & Abernathy: 1975) and open opportunities for standardization and mass production. 2 The third phase is that of the mature technology. Innovation continues to take place but incrementally along the established technological trajectory. The history of the internal combustion engine follows this path, as did many other mechanically based technologies of the past. New wave technologies, however, have three defining features that differentiate them from these earlier industrial technologies: their science-base, patent-intensity and systemic embeddedness. These differences suggest that the forces and factors shaping the pattern of technological change are also likely to differ. In what follows we explore these characteristics and their implications for the pace at which a dominant design is established, costs are reduced and systemic constraints are removed.
(i) A broad knowledge base increasingly anchored in the sciences
New wave technologies are anchored in the sciences and their knowledge base has developed less as the result of incremental change along a single technological trajectory, than through a combination of several distinct trajectories with significantly different scientific roots. These divers roots, however, increasingly share a common platform -that of working at the nano-level of photons and genes 3 . As a result, the research laboratory has become central in the discovery and development of new products and processes based on these technologies; so much so that the revolution in molecular biology is said to have blurred the boundary between research and production (Henderson et al.: 1999, 267; Eliasson & Eliasson:1997,140 ).
2 Carlota Perez (2002,30) divides this phase into two: the full constellation of new industries, technology systems and infrastructure followed by the full expansion of innovation and market potential deriving from the technological revolution. 3 Michael Best has distinguished four technological periods characterized by diminishing critical size dimensions: the mechanical, electrical, electronic and nano-levels (ranging from 10 to 10 -12 meters, mega to terahertz/sec or in photonics 10 -12 bits/sec) (Best:2001,133 ).
Whereas models of technological change have traditionally distinguished between innovation in products and in production technologies and generally regarded these as sequential processes (Utterback & Abernathy:1975) , new wave technologies tend to fuse product and process innovation at the experimental stage, that is, in the laboratory. Though accidental discoveries continue to occur, working at the nano-level, leaves less space for the individual 'inventortinkerer/ entrepreneur' who filled the pages of technological change in the past (Landes: 1969) and whose virtues were sung by many (Schumpeter: 1939; 1942) .
The products of new wave technologies are similarly combinatorial. On the input side, the ability to develop such products and to establish a 'dominant design' in industries growing out of new wave technologies has depended upon innovations from across a wide range of scientific and industrial domains. On the output side, these are rarely stand-alone products. Systems integration is so common a feature of new wave technologies that they have often been described as 'generic' technologies.
The combinatorial nature of new wave technologies requires both a wide range of knowledge inputs and a strong science and engineering base. Yet much of the literature on catching up in developing countries takes as its model, the slow, incremental process of change that characterized the mechanically based industries of earlier technological revolutions. From the perspective of the textile industry, for example, a "literate and numerate labor force is the important requisite" (Pack: 2000,79) . But if we look more carefully at the catch-up strategies pursued in the Korean automobile and electronics industries, it was already evident that "….
imitative reverse engineering was possible only because Korea had a good stock of well-trained human resources" especially engineers (Kim and Yi: 1997,168) . Most developing countries were ill equipped to follow the Korean path and without a radical rebalancing of current educational practices to strengthen tertiary education and build networks among centers of research and training excellence, closing the knowledge gaps of the future will be even more difficult.
(ii) New strategies of knowledge generation and appropriation A number of consequences for the pattern of competition flow from the high costs and risks inherent in science-based innovation, the combinatorial nature of new wave technologies and the systems integratedness of their products. These add to the difficulties faced by developing countries in catching up.
Size and scale, for example, remain critical in the manufacture of products based on new wave technologies and these are radically changing the nature of competition in industries in which 11 these technologies are applied. Historically, incremental changes that enhance the manufacturability of products and economies of scale in production have been critical in reducing costs and speeding technological diffusion and they remain important despite the greater role that science plays in new wave technologies. It would be misleading, therefore, to assume that technological knowledge, "…acquired and accumulated in crude empirical ways, with no reliance upon science" would not continue to play a role (Rosenberg: 1982,143) as it
has in the refinement of products and manufacturing processes in earlier waves of technological change. 4 Once again, however, new wave technologies exhibit a variation on this theme in several ways.
The combinatorial nature of products based on new wave technologies and their integration into the products and processes of other technological systems opens the way for larger firms to play a more prominent role in shaping the technological trajectory and the speed with which new wave technologies are incorporated into the production process than in the past. The cascade of products flowing from the application of microprocessors and lasers to audio/visual equipment, for example, has been shaped by only a handful of large firms and their partners (Delapierre & Mytelka:2003) . The application of biotechnology in the pharmaceutical sector has followed this pattern and we would expect something similar to emerge in the development of fuel cell technology.
Strategies of knowledge generation and appropriation that privilege larger firms are also playing a more significant role in new wave technologies than in earlier mechanical technologies. In this, they resemble those few science-based industries of the past --chemicals, petrochemicals and later pharmaceuticals 5 --whose relatively high research and development (R&D) costs were partly amortized through patenting. Though patenting might, under other circumstances, strengthen the role of small innovative firms, new wave technologies do not exhibit the traditional Schumpeterian pattern of industrial dynamics in which innovation gives rise to a high rate of new firm entry in a 4 Indeed," …we routinely fly in airplanes the optimal designs of which are achieved by fairly ad hoc, trail-and-error processes because there are no theories of turbulence or compressibility adequate to determine optimal configurations in advance. Extensive testing and modification based upon test results are still required." (Rosenberg:1982,143) . 5 The chemically-based pharmaceutical industry was a latecomer in this process and much of the attention of biochemists and microbiologists in the 1920s and 30s was, in fact, focused on hydrocarbon chemistry in the petroleum sector and it was there that most innovations took place. Catalytic cracking in a fully continuous flow process, for example, drew together five of the major oil companies, two process technology firms and the set of German chemical companies which formed the IG Farben cartel into a collaborative R&D project that Chris Freeman describes as "…one of the largest single programmes before the atom bomb" (Freeman:1982,62 Moving an innovation from laboratory to the market, moreover, increasingly requires partners and a pattern of precocious partnering for research and development as well as standard setting has developed in industries based on ICTs (Mytelka:2001) and biotechnology (Mytelka:2003) .
This, in turn, has given rise to changes in the nature of competition in the emergent and transitional phases of these technologies. In contrast to the arms-length firm-to-firm competition characteristic of earlier waves of technological change, in industries based on new wave technologies competition takes place among networks of firms bound to each other through a variety of alliances. Few firms from the developing world are partners in these knowledge networks.
The emergence of knowledge-based networks that extend across borders and industries has stimulated a pattern of oligopolistic market competition on a global scale. Unlike traditional oligopolies based on the statics of cross licensing and market sharing, however, knowledge-based networked oligopolies involve collaboration in the creation of new knowledge and in control over its evolution. They are dynamic, seeking to shape future technological trajectories as opposed to merely rigidifying the status quo.
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Through mutual forbearance and attention to the market strategies of rivals, oligopolistic competition among these knowledge-based networks may accelerate the process of technological diffusion at the same time as it structures the form and direction that technological change takes. This was evident in a variety of segments within the ICT sector, and how such competitive processes unfold will undoubtedly affect the speed with which fuel cell technologies are applied in automotive sector. system as these were evolving. As the innovation system could be built up incrementally and the knowledge intensity of production in different parts of the production process varied, many points of entry from a low skill base created opportunities for catching up by developing countries.
Overtime, the industries founded on these earlier waves of technological change, developed standardized components whose manufacture could be distributed among firms at a distance and 14 subsequently assembled. New opportunities were thus created for technological upgrading in developing countries that could progress incrementally, as the knowledge, skill and production base expanded and deepened. This process of technological capability building has been well studied in the textile and clothing, automobile and auto parts and consumer electronics industries of the 1960s,1970s and 1980s (Amsden:1989; Lall:1990; Hobday:1995; Kim:1997; Ernst, Ganiatsos & Mytelka:1998; Humphrey:1998 , Wong:2001 In other instances, an existing system benefited from a new technology that could be incorporated. Early numerically controlled machine tools built upon an existing base in the custom machine tool industry. So, too, did fixed-line telecommunications systems move from manual switching, to mechanical cross-bar and then digital switches, each time incorporating a technology developed elsewhere into an already existing system. Although the investment costs of introducing these new innovations were high, the technology system in its broad outlines was already in place and in each case some developing countries moved in behind the front-runners putting the infrastructure in place and building the knowledge base needed to compete. (Desai et al:1999; Mytelka:1999) .
In the genesis and emergence of radical technological changes, however, there is always some degree of discontinuity in infrastructure and institutions and a need, therefore, to learn new ways of doing things and unlearn habits and practices of the past. The more embedded a technology is in other systems, the higher the risks to enterprises in their development and diffusion and the greater the resistance to change. Market forces alone, therefore, often fail to stimulate and support an innovation process when coordination requirements are high. The relative weight between the different parametric considerations that affect the speed and form of technological change, however, can be shifted through a broad range of government policy initiatives, in the absence of which transition periods may be longer, more difficult and more costly.
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The basic contours of the approach taken here in analyzing the time horizon available to developing countries before the next wave of technology bursts upon them are graphically represented in Figure One and can be summed up in the following terms. The pace and direction of technological change is largely a function of the speed with which a dominant design emerges, costs are reduced and systemic constraints are removed. Each of these broader variables can be further decomposed. For example, the speed with which a dominant design emergences in new wave technologies, will likely depend upon the availability of finance for research and of technological integration. Both the speed at which a dominant design emerges and there is movement down the cost curve in industries based on these technologies will also depend on the formation of alliances through which standards can be set and the closer coordination needed for technological integration takes place. This will permit the development of economics of scale and scope which are prerequisites to cost reduction. Policy can play a major role in removing the constraints flowing from systemic embeddedness by altering the trade offs between the relative costs and risks of 'preservation vs. innovation' for the enterprise and for the consumer 7 . In the following two sections this framework is applied to analyze the pace and direction of technological change in the adoption of the internal combustion engine and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles.
THE DEVELOPMENT PATH OF THE INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINES
The internal combustion engine (ICE) was known since the late 17 th century and its first commercial application took place in the 18 th century in pumping water from coalmines. These engines used powdered coal as a fuel since liquid fuels, such as those derived from petroleum or even alcohol were not yet available. Two centuries later, in 1862, Alphonse Beau de Rochas formalized the two major principals underlying the operation of such engines. The first was the compression of the combustible mixture prior to ignition and the importance of the compression ratio, that is, the lowest attainable ratio of surface to volume in the engine, to 'engine efficiency'. The second, the four stroke cycle in the reciprocating inward and outward movement of the pistons, was applied a decade later by Nicolaus August Otto to the development of an internal combustion engine and this cycle has since been called the Otto
Cycle.
The emergence of the modern automobile can be dated to 1885 when the first vehicle propulsion by an internal combustion engine was developed in Germany simultaneously by Karl
Benz and Gottlieb Daimler and patented by the latter (Graedel & Allenby:1998) . By the turn of the century, the internal combustion engine had become solidly established as the dominant design, replacing earlier experiments with steam and electric powered vehicles, though the latter remained an alternative in small niche markets 8 . The hand crafted automobiles of this period, however, were luxury products "…the playthings of the wealthy few" (Utterback:1994,127) . In 1906, more than two decades after the first automobiles had appeared in Europe, the total number of such vehicles being produced across the whole of Western Europe each year came only to 50,000. (Hoffman & Kaplinsky: 1988,74) . By that time, however, a dominant design had emerged.
The transitional period was marked by changes in production processes and organizational structures. In production, the major innovation was the adoption of automatic materials transfer in the manufacture of the Ford Model T. This speeded up the flow of parts and their assembly making mass production a reality (Best; . By 1914, the Ford Assembly line alone was capable of producing 300,000 vehicles per year and the price of cars dropped dramatically (Hoffman & Kaplinsky; 1988,74) . Techniques of mass production were subsequently adopted elsewhere. Daimler Benz, for example, was in the forefront among European producers.
Organizationally, the corporate model came to dominate the industry, beginning with the 8 Postal service delivery vans, for example.
18 incorporation of General Motors in 1908 and a few months later its acquisition of Buick 9 . Other companies soon followed suit.
The further development and widespread use of the automobile powered by an internal combustion engine, however, was constrained by a number of systems within which it was embedded. One of these was the technological system involved in the production of fuel, including the development of catalytic cracking processes (Freeman: 1982,62) improvements in the antiknock quality of the fuel, expressed as its octane number and higher extraction of gasoline from the same quantity of petroleum through the use of heat, pressure and catalysts to rearrange the molecules of economically less important distilled fractions.
The second was the infrastructure upon which the automobile depended, notably, a distribution network for gasoline and a system of paved roads and highways. The Standard Oil Company, which had been founded in the United States in 1865, was innovative in locating its refineries near railroad lines and planning oil shipments so that railroad companies could make up daily oil trains. Investments in pipelines to link oil fields with refineries and railroads were undertaken later. Some usable infrastructure was thus in place when the sale of automobiles began in earnest. Roads were another matter, since the competition with railroads for long distance travel had favored the latter during the 19 th century. Public financing of roads and highways was an important factor in the widespread development of a road network after World War I.
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Between 1908 and 1927 some 15 million Model T Fords were sold. The transition period drew to a close when the Model A was introduced in 1928, followed shortly by the V.8 engine series.
Thereafter progress was slow and took place along an incremental technological trajectory marked by tradeoffs between power, efficiency and fuel economy. These are often attributed to consumer preferences. In the decades before the oil crisis in 1973, an overall reduction in mechanical novelty and variety resulted, although options proliferated (Abernathy:1978) .
Changes that did occur in production processes, moreover, led to such dedicated systems that opportunities for further innovation were significantly reduced 11 . As the problem of emissions were slowly recognized, their solution was reconceptualized within this nexus and strategies of preservation rather than innovation resulted. "It is not that automotive technologies haven't improved; it's that the improvements have been geared toward delivering power, not efficiency" (Fischetti:2002,42) . The choice of an incremental path that favored preservation over innovation can be illustrated in the evolution of carburetion and fuel injection systems and by the adoption of the catalytic converter.
Efficient operation of gasoline spark-ignition engines, for example, depends on the air-fuel mixture. Ensuring that the mixture is delivered to the combustion chamber well atomized and at exactly the right ratio of air to fuel can be carried out by a carburetor or by a fuel injection system 12 . The camshaft, a century old mechanism that opens and closes the engine valves which let a fuel and air mixture into the combustion chambers and release exhaust gases is still the dominant design. "A spinning shaft, it moves levers that open and close valves approximately 100 times per second in a fixed pattern" (Fischetti:2002, 46 ( Fischetti: 2002,46) . Gasoline direct injection and digital microprocessors to control fuel and injection systems and spark advance are only the latest such improvements designed to preserve the mechanical base of this aging system.
The problem of emissions was recognized as early as the 1940s. By the mid-1960s motor vehicles were creating 86 million tons of pollutants per year most of which was carbon monoxide. Unburned fuel, nitrogen oxides, sulfur oxides, particles and lead compounds made up the rest. In 1965 the State of California adopted the first legislation to control exhaust products. The US Federal Government adopted identical laws two years later.
The initial reduction in carbon monoxide and unburned fuel emissions was done by modifying carburetion, using a leaner mixture and modifying ignition timing. This reduced compression ratios but these would increase again with some refinement in combustion-chamber designs to 1989; Newcomb & Spurr:1989) . Figure 2 illustrates the incremental development path of the internal combustion engine since its application to transportation.
12 Most of these systems were first innovated in the late 1920s in mechanical form and later updated electronically.
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Consumers have always placed a high value on dependability in choosing a car. But other preferences have loomed large at various moments in time. The oil price shocks of the 1970s seem to have marked the 1981 preference structure with its emphasis on fuel economy (Table   1) . Six years later, however, fuel economy was of least importance to the consumer and price had along with dependability become the prime concern. In the latter half of the 1990s, safety had replaced both fuel economy and price as the second most important buying preference. This change in preference was accompanied by a rise in sales of SUVs and other large vehicles. Despite the brief blip in consumer preferences for fuel economy, in terms of the trade off between efficiency, power and pollution, consumers and producers alike, have joined forces over this 20-year period in the pursuit of power. This is reflected in data from the US Environmental Protection Agency which shows that since the 1980s, horse power has increased by 84 percent "allowing vehicles to accelerate faster even though they have gotten heavier" at the expense of fuel efficiency. (Fischetti: 2002,41-42) . Emissions have thus remained a problem and as automobile sales rose in the developing world and Eastern Europe, the internal combustion engine came increasingly under fire in international milieu as a significant and growing source of environmental damage.
Rather than engine efficiency, emissions and energy concerns are thus driving the move away from the gasoline powered internal combustion engine. Through regulatory policies, tax incentives and financial support for research and development (R&D) attention was directed primarily in two directions neither of which have produced the required magnitude of change.
The electric vehicle floundered on the continued technological problems of battery storage and the consumer preference for rapid acceleration and refueling ( Neufville et al.:1996) . Its successor, hybrid cars such as the Toyota Prius and Honda Insight have only recently been commercialized and others will not appear until this year. Despite their newness, they are 21 clearly an intermediary solution based on incremental improvements to the old model.
Alternative fuels such as ethanol, when based on grains, still require heavy subsidies and make only a small dent in the overall pollution problem when they provide only 10 percent of the fuel.
We Partly because of their potential for miniaturization and thus use in mobile equipment, the military maintained a residual interest in the PEM fuel cell. In the early 1980s, the Canadian Department of National Defense (DND), put out a research tender to produce a 'low cost' PEM fuel cell that could run on impure hydrogen produced by reforming a liquid fuel like methanol (Koppel:1999,63-64) . Ballard, a small, Vancouver-based company founded in 1979 and doing research on lithium batteries, won this three-year contract. The first Ballard cell was based on the old GE fuel cell but used a Nafion® membrane and replaced the GE flow field plates made of niobium by sheets of graphite with carefully machined fine groves on the electrode side of each plate (Koppel:1999,77) . Both this innovation and the development of a special manifold to distribute the gases (Koppel:1999,80) were then patented. In two years, Ballard succeeded in developing an eight-cell stack that produced 130 watts, considerably higher than the 50-100 watts specified in the DND contract (Koppel:1999,86) . By mid-1986 they had succeeded in creating a 12-stack version capable of producing 280 watts. DND awarded Ballard a second contract for further development. If changing the flow field design had quadrupled the performance in the first phase of its development, finding a new membrane 14 would result in yet another steep jump and the growing awareness at Ballard that 'these power densities and overload capabilities could make the electric automobile happen" (Savage:1987,16).
For Ballard to play a role in further developing the PEM fuel cell for the automobile industry, a change in organizational model and in financing would be necessary. (Koppel:1999,126) . In Much as the pace of technological change had accelerated in the latter half of the 1960s, so, too, had the speed with which alliances were consolidated and systems integration was pursued.
Two broad alliances emerged in this process 16 . Fundamentally different in construction, the first, Currently, each of these alliances is pushing forward its own set of standards with regard to the choice of fuel, as this is linked to fuel cell design, and the need for either an on-board reformer or an on-board fuel storage system. Costs, technological complexity and time to market will affect tradeoffs here. But the choice of fuel is also system embedded and the availability of infrastructure and social acceptance can be expected to shape the parameters within which a decision about fuel will be taken. and a radically new car concept, is today the major proponent of gasoline powered fuel cell vehicles. At issue are the interests and preferences of both producers and consumers, the systems embeddedness of the technology and the role of public policies in shaping the parameters within which these decisions will be made. These are summed up in Figure 7 and related to the establishment of a dominant design. 17 Step on the throttle and a 20 percent solution of sodium borohydride "is pumped past a catalyst made of ruthenium. This strips the hydrogen out of the compound and feeds it to the vehicle's fuel cell stack. The used slurry is then stored until it is time to refuel, when it is pumped out while a fresh batch is loaded" (Economist:2002,71) . The reformer was built by Millennium cell. The Hydrogen-on-Demand® process eliminates on-board hydrogen storage and reduces dependency on fossil fuels. To the extent that it is widely available, it improves fuel security.
If the primary goal is speed to market, then a gasoline powered fuel cell car appears to be a rational choice in the short term. Appearances, however, might be deceiving. Developing a small on-board gasoline reformer for GM cars may yet take years. However, by minimizing the problems of both systemic embeddedness in an existing fuel distribution network and social embeddedness in the preference of both oil companies and consumers to preserve the old, that is preserve older products and existing infrastructure in the case of oil companies and maintain traditional habits and practices with respect to rapid refueling at a multitude of existing fueling stations, gasoline is the least disruptive of the choices. Once Toyota joined GM in a partnership to develop gasoline powered FCVs 18 , Nissan and Renault announced that they, too, would move in this direction as it now appeared that a gasoline powered fuel cell car would likely become the American standard. 19 But the life cycle of gasoline does not make it an optimal technology from the environmental perspective, nor does it increase fuel security in the medium-term. By continuing to rely on gasoline, we reinforce existing habits and practices and reduce incentives to undertake the needed investments in longer term, more comprehensive change.
Methanol, derived from natural gas, represents a middle road. It has a higher octane number allowing for higher compression ratios and hence greater thermal efficiency compared to gasoline engines. Its well-to-wheel energy consumption is also lower than that for gasoline although tiny amounts of carbon monoxide and oxides of nitrogen are produced by the operation of the reformer and small amounts of evaporative emission may come from the fuel tank (IEA:1999,23-27; Williams: 1994,24) . Many of the complementary technologies, such as processes for the production of methanol from natural gas and for the distribution of natural gas already exist and a number of countries with important automotive markets have significant natural-gas vehicle fleets. 20 . Thus, countries that "…. have natural gas distribution grids can introduce it as a vehicle fuel relatively easily, but nations without such infrastructures will find them very costly to establish" (IEA: 1999,23) . In using methanol to power fuel cells, considerable progress has also been made. Small on-board methanol reformers are already installed in test vehicles and high compression canisters for on-board storage have been developed and tested. Methanol is also a close substitute for gasoline in the pattern of refueling 18 In December 24, 2002 the Wall St. Journal reported that GM and Toyota had decided to "gar up to produce hybrid gasoline-and-electric versions of sport utility vehicles and pick up trucks" Clearly GM is still running scared after earlier efforts to produce and sell electric vehicles. The company now announces that its " goal is to be ready to build as many U.S. hybrids as U.S. consumers will buy, but not to be saddled with so many that it has to sell them at a loss…" EV World "GM, Toyota to make Vehicles that use Hybrid Energy". http:// www.evworld.com/databases/printit.cfm?Pageid-news. and the distance between refueling stops. 21 The choice of methanol, however, will lead to heavy investment costs in countries where natural gas is not readily available; the installed methanol production capacity is weak and the distribution network limited or non-existent. A methanol consortium was formed in September 2000 to assess further the relative costs and availability of methanol production, delivery and reforming technologies.
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In the choice of hydrogen, there is an image problem to overcome as some still emphasize its explosive potential if stored as a gas. But there are a number of solutions to the distribution and on-board storage problems that are already commercially available. These derive from earlier experiences with the liquefaction and compression of natural gas (LNG & CNG) and demonstrate the safety of hydrogen in these two forms. Hydrogen powered fuel cell vehicle prototypes using these solutions are currently on the roads. They store hydrogen on-board under high pressure in canisters made of lightweight, high strength material such as aluminum wrapped with carbon fiber. Hydrogen powered FCVs are environmentally friendly but complementary technologies still need to be developed to ensure sustainable and energy efficient hydrogen production and the infrastructure for delivering hydrogen at the pump or to the home is in its infancy. Several experimental hydrogen fueling stations have been set up in Japan, Iceland, the European Union 23 and California as part of programmes to road test hydrogen powered FCVs 24 and by the end of 2003 there will be some 60 hydrogen fuel stations operating around the world (Geiger:2003,4) , but the infrastructure costs of building a distribution network from scratch are very high.
The above review of options, however brief, raises a number of the critical questions that still need to be answered. Should we embark on building hydrogen fueling stations now, or should we wait until new complementary reforming or electrolyzing technologies are available to use the natural gas, water and electricity that already comes into homes and workplaces thus saving considerably on investments in infrastructure? Who will make such decisions and how will they be made? If we do take this giant step forward into a hydrogen economy, what kinds of hydrogen storage systems, especially in vehicles, would be socially acceptable? One possible future scenario involves research currently underway on the absorption of hydrogen into solid 21 Although "…the energy content of a unit volume of methanol is half that of gasoline, the fuel-cell car would be more than twice as efficient." (Williams:1994,23) Should we thus adopt an intermediary technology and if we do attempt to reduce levels of pollution by using methanol or reformed gasoline, would this slow down the pace of realizing the ultimate goal of a hydrogen economy?
Despite the length of the emergence phase in the development of fuel cell vehicles and the range of issues that are still to be resolved, there is no doubt that considerable progress towards bringing PEM fuel cell vehicles to market has been made since the mid-1990s. A number of indicators support such a conclusion.
All major automobile companies have announced programmes to build fuel cell vehicles and many of these are investing heavily in doing so. Though the emergence phase might thus be longer, given that current new ICE engine programmes will end by 2012/2013 (Truett: 2001, 39) , and in view of the intensity of the work underway, the transition is likely to be very much shorter. Historically, rapid movement down the cost curve through standardization and the creation of economies of scale, moreover, did not take place until a dominant design had emerged. Will the fuel cell car be different? Some of the data presented above, on dual use fuel cell technology, suggests that it will. With respect to fuel cells and the transport sector, however, we have far too little information on costs to evaluate this process.
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CONCLUSION
If the future is 'hydrogen' should we wait until all pieces of the system are in place or do environmental considerations force us to take action now? If the latter, how might we build a path today that does not compromise change in the future? With regard to the transport sector, can two solutions -methanol and hydrogen, for example, coexist without wasteful investment?
Would investment in gasoline reforming keep the market for petroleum buoyant and reduce incentives for change?
Among the many tradeoffs to be considered in dealing with the above questions, three are of particular importance:
The cost and complexity of short term vs. longer term horizons with respect to emissions reduction, fuel security and infrastructure investment,
(ii) The impact of these choices on industry structure, competition and prices, and (iii) The incentives and constraints that present choices will create for innovation in the future.
Policies will clearly have a major impact in shaping the parameters within which the choice between tradeoffs will be made. Given the social, economic and environmental consequences that flow from each of these choices, dialogue between stakeholders would be needed to build awareness of these potential consequences. Here a consensus-conference mechanism that involved oil and gas companies as well as other energy producers and users, automobile and auto parts firms, the range of actors involved in fuel cell and ancillary technologies, researchers, consumers, environmentalists and policy-makers from national and local (urban) levels, would be a particularly effective means to assist government in arriving at socially and economically acceptable tradeoffs.
Support for policies that are oriented towards change, moreover, can only be secured through such a mechanism. Governments in the North will thus have to take a pro-active stance to 'promote the new' by organizing such a process. In parallel, there will be a need to create the kind of 'public knowledge goods' that have largely been missing in the rapid development of alliances and high rate of patenting. A better understanding of costs standardized testing procedures and vetted empirical studies are the foundation upon which serious social reflection and consensus building can be created.
Given the pressures upon governments, North and South, to deal with environmental pollution, can we wait until a consensus process plays itself out in the North before involving the South?
Even more critically can the North carry out its own policies in building a hydrogen economy From the perspective of the south, how the North deals with environmental pollution has a strong bearing on their own opportunities for growth. These cannot simply be reduced to accommodate lower levels of pollution world-wide. Instead, that growth must be hitched to the development and diffusion of technologies associated with the hydrogen economy. Yet the process of catching-up in these new wave technologies is significantly different from traditional, engineering-based industries of the past. In these earlier waves of technological change, catching up depended more upon deepening production capabilities thereby ensuring that the clones, copies or OEM goods were, at the least, of similar quality and yet initially competitive because they were cheaper. There was thus no need for much domestic R&D in the early phase of a catch up process. Adaptation, modification that led to productivity increases or capital stretching could largely take place within the firm and through the strengthening of engineering capabilities. The process of catching up in these industries was thus an incremental one, in terms of the kinds of knowledge -bases that were needed, the sequential way in which they would be acquired, and the gradual building up of the system that enabled the imported technologies to function optimally in their new environment.
In science-based, patent intensive and systems embedded new wave technologies, however, the process of catching up differs from this traditional incremental process and its focus on single enterprises and on building basic skills first. Tertiary education and research are needed from the outset as they permit close monitoring of the changing technological frontier, enable the identification of opportunities for entry into new productive activities and provide the base for a more holistic, systems-oriented approach to policymaking for the transition. These new capabilities will have to be developed, as will the awareness, that such a focus is even necessary. The creation of new informal mechanisms for dialogue on these issues, both NorthSouth and South-South, are of potential utility here.
Across the South, needs are different and a standardized approach to the transition would not be appropriate. For oil producers in the South, the hydrogen economy spells a significant drop in oil consumption 31 and revenues, potentially within 20 years. While this allows for at least a short period of time in which to develop alternative uses for fossil fuels, such alternatives will have to be identified and the research and production capabilities put in place over the next 10 to 15 years. Similarly, for developing countries that have become involved in assembling automobiles and producing parts and components, the car of the future will require new skills and new knowledge. Strengthening the local knowledge base, ensuring its flexibility, engaging more intensively in domestic-demand driven research and creating new sorts of knowledge networks and partnerships will be needed to make a transition happen in these countries.
More broadly still, most developing countries are moving down an older technological path as they continue to build their vehicle-related infrastructure -the auto repair services, fuel distribution networks, fueling stations-around the internal combustion engine and the consumption of gasoline. This is all the more serious as many developing countries have become major importers of used cars thus creating a stronger incentive to strengthen a fossil fuel-based system. Were this to continue, North and South would find themselves on divergent paths with an ever wider technological divide between then. How should they then proceed?
The answer is not intuitively obvious and a period of reflection and dialogue will be needed to arrive at a consensus on a country-by-country basis. In this connections, there is much to be learned from the experience of those countries in the North and the South which have engaged in foresight exercises and have organized stakeholder meetings and consensus conferences to deal with difficult decisions of great public importance.
Even then, there are a number of steps that can be envisaged and that begin to create a knowledge base on how to manage a transition in developing countries. One of the most important is the opportunity to study the outcomes and experiences of current experiments in the introduction of fuel cell buses in urban environments in the five countries in which this is currently underway and to immediately extend this experiment to a number of poorer developing countries to better assess the needs in their environments. Attacking urban environments first is potential a strong candidate for beginning the transition in a developing country context since much of the CO 2 pollution is concentrated there. It provides an excellent learning environment with minimal costs since focusing upon the use of fuel cell buses in large cities requires a relatively limited investment in new infrastructure. It also avoids the need for an onboard reformer, which adds to the high cost of fuel cell driven vehicles, as there is space available for hydrogen storage tanks on the roof. Technology of this sort has already been tested for other alternative fuels in both bus and taxi fleets, but its widespread adoption will require new policy initiatives and new financial resources, to speed-up the conversion process.
As this third wave of technological change approaches, we have an opportunity to learn from the past. By putting in place the structures and processes needed to deal with transition in the South now, it may be possible to avoid a cumulative growth in knowledge divides and global inequalities. 
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